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FOR RELEASE TUESDAY A.M.'S 
REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA) 
at the 
BEGOLE-BROWNELL LECTURE, OLIVET COLLEGE, OLIVET, MICHIGAN 
Monday, March 29, 1971 
8:00 p.m. c.s.t. 
THE NIXAN DOCTRINE 
I have not come here t~ make a political speech. Spring is 
not the season for politics, unless you are a young man running 
for the Presidency. Or unless you are a President in your first 
term. I am no longer that young. I am in my fourth term in the 
Senate. I run for office only in Montana and I have only recently 
been re-elected. 
In any event, the subject of my remarks is not political. 
The Nixon Doctrine is n~t a partisan policy. It was not advanced 
by the President as a partisan thrust. It was not met in the 
Senate with a political parry. On the contrary, when the Presider-t 
issued this Declaration on Asian p~licy eighteen months ag~, 
support was immediately extended to him from the Senate. It 
came from Republicans and it came from Democrats . 
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What differences there are with regard to foreign relations, 
derive from policies not from politics and they are shared by 
members of both parties. The Senate, today, is not an intensely 
partisan forum. As Majority Leader, I have no political axes to 
grind. My relationship with a Republican President has been 
correct and cordial. In matters of foreign policy, the relation-
ship does not differ greatly from that which existed with his 
predecessor, a Democrat. 
Over the years in Washington, I have seen s omething of the 
burdens of the Presidency. They are great and lonely. In foreign 
affairs, the President is out in front at all times. The pressure 
is direct and relentless. In this connection, when the late 
John F. Kennedy assumed personal responsibility for the Cuban 
debacle, he quoted an old saying, "victory has a hundred fathers 
and defeat is an orphan." 
Regardless of party, a President is entitled to under-
standing in his responsibil ities . Since I have been in the Senate, 
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it has been my practice to extend to the incumbent of the 
Presidency whatever I could in the way of support, cooperation 
and consolation. In doing so, however, I have not overlooked 
the separate Constitutional obligations of Senators nor the 
Leadership's additional responsibilities to the other 99 members 
of the Senate. Three Presidents have known that I do not stand 
on partisan ground. They have also known where I stood on the 
issues. 
The Nixon Doctrine is one of those issues because it 
is a touchstone in our relations with Asia and the rest of the 
world. The Doctrine was set forth with the intent of bringing 
about an adjustment in U. S. policy in the Western Pacific. 
Eighteen months later, there is concern with the follow-through. 
This concern does not arise from a retrogression to 
some sort of isolation. Provided the issues are clearly 
presented, the people of the nation are discerni ng enough t o 
r ecognize that the alternative to one distortion is not another. 
I reiterate, provided the issues are clearly presented. 
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There is no escape by national isolation from the 
complexities of our times. We will have to live with these 
complexities and work with them, and do so in cooperation with 
other nations of the world or in conflict with other nations. 
There is no shell of sky large enough to shut out the rest of 
the globe. There is no sweep of ocean. There is no electronic 
shield, no insulating web of missiles. 
Isolation is no answer to the nation's needs. But 
neither is internationalism some sort of incantation against 
the ills of international life. We will search in vain to 
safeguard our security and well-being by an internationalism 
which leads us to project military forces into the farthest 
reaches of the globe and to mainta i n them there without the 
comprehension of the people of this nation and without the 
understanding and cooperation of the rest of the world's people . 
That reality ought not to be overlooked in an exce ss 
of concern in t.h~ ExeCllti ve Rra.nf'l1 tha t . the hmcr ican people 
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will "retreat to isolation, " at any suggestion of an adjustment 
in the present course of foreign policy. We would do well, 
instead, to note carefully the danger of persisting in a course 
which has already alienated many people at home and abroad and 
has led the nation a long way down the road to an isolated 
internationalism. 
If I may lay aside, then, this non-issue of isolation 
along with partisan politics, as a basis for my remarks, I would 
like to turn your attention, now, to the Nixon Doctrine. The 
subject is of particular interest because shortly after the 
Doctrine was set forth in the summer of 1969, I went to Southeast 
Asia. I did so at the request of the Pnesident, and in the 
course of the journey, sought to convey some understanding of 
the President's new approach to Asia. 
In a public report in September 1969, I pointed out 
that the Nixon Doctrine did not mean the United States was tu~n-
ing its back on Asia. Rather, the Doctrine wa s designed t o 
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reduce the factor of U. S. military participation in the 
problems of that region. The Doctrine's aim, too, was to fore-
close new situations of dependency as had developed in Viet Nam; 
contrary to our interests such situations tended to lead to 
involvement in Asian conflicts. 
In further interpretation of the Doctrine, I noted 
that we intended to alter aid-policies by placing more emphasis 
on economic aid and less on military help. Even with regard to 
economic aid, moreover, it was to be expected that we would 
shift from a unilateral approach and participate when desirable 
in whatever multi-sided cooperation Asian nations were inclined 
to develop themselves. 
I made clear that the Nixon Doctrine did, indeed, 
imply major adjustments in long-standing U. S. policies in the 
Western Pacific, policies which had been formulated in the 
aftermath of World War II and the Korean War. Circumstances 
had long since changed greatly and we had not kept pace. As 
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a result, we found ourselves more deeply involved in Southeast 
Asia than warranted by the nation's interests. The U. S. role 
had become both anachronistic and wasteful. Most seriously, an 
over-long persistence in that role had led us into the tragedy 
of Viet Nam. The time had come to alter it. 
It seemed to me that the essence of the Nixon Doctrine 
was to be found in the President's frequent references to a new 
"low-profile 1' policy. I agreed fully with that concept and so 
stated many times in Asia and at home. Moreover, the Administra-
tion soon made clear that the new Doctrine would apply, not only 
in Asia but throughout the world. With that extension, too, I 
agreed completely. 
During 1969 and the early months of 1970, the Executive 
Branch elaborated the Nixon Doctrine in specific actions. The 
U. S. military base structure was curtailed in the Far East. 
Reductions were made in official personnel throughout the region. 
The Executive Branch entered into negotiations with the Japanese 
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government pursuant to the agreement which the Preident had 
achieved with Japan on the Okinawan question. That settlement 
promised to remove a spur of increasing tension in U. S.-Japanese 
relations. Largely by the President's personal efforts, diplo-
matic relations were restored with Prince Sihanouk's Cambodia 
and the restoration seemed to check the danger of a spill-over 
of Vietnamese hostilities into that nation. Initiatives were 
also taken by the President to enlarge contact with the Chinese 
People's Republic. 
The most significant implications of the Nixon Doctrine, 
of course, involved Viet Nam. Despite obvious difficulties of 
immediate application, U. S. military forces in Viet Nam were 
reduced by 100,000 men between July 1969 a~d Ap~il 1970. With 
the reduction came a sharp drop in casualties and in the cost of 
the war. At the same time, new U. S. leadership was supplied to 
the negotiations in Paris. Hopes quickened for a negotiated 
peace in Viet Nam. 
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Elsewhere in the world, the inertia in U. S. policy 
seemed to be ending under the impetus of the Nixon Doctrine. 
There were indications of an intentm reduce the cost of main-
taining a garrison of half a million military personnel and 
dependents i n Western Europe. The new SALT talks on disarmament. 
as they involved ICBM's, ABM's and other laconic euphemisms of 
civilization's suicide, opened on an encouraging note. A 
Defense budget, swollen with cost over-runs and oth2r waste as 
well as the price of the Vietnamese War, ~egan to be curbed in 
the wake of the Senate's great debate on the Anti-Ballistics 
Missile. 
The Nixon Doctrine, in short, appeared to have set 
off a chain reaction which promised to br i ng up to date t he 
nation's international security affairs. It was most welcome 
in the Senate and in the nation. For a l 0ng time, we had 
remained wedded to the needs of another era. We had continued 
to indulge ourselves with polic i es and practice ~ born of 
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another time. As a nation, we had been so deeply concerned 
for two decades with threats from abroad, that we had overlooked 
the erosion of the nati~n's inner security and well-being. 
The Nixon Doctrine opened the shutters on these musty 
thought-processes. In so doing, there was revealed the possi-
bility of adjustments of policy abroad which would also redound 
to the benefit of the situation within the nation. Billions of 
dollars of taxes, not to speak of the creative skills a~d energy 
of young people, were involved in the excessive and increasingly 
isolated search for national security in Viet Nam and elsewhere 
abroad. With the advent of the Nixon Doctrine, it seemed that 
some of these Druffiense resources might begin to be channeled 
into urgent needs at home. 
In my judgment, the President dese:':'ves g:~eat credit 
for having established this turning point. The Nixon Doctrine 
was an invitation to change--long overdue clwt:ge-- if 1 tl'ay use 
that overworked word, a c hange in priorities. 
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Then, there was April 30, 1970 and the American 
military incursion into Cambodia. The event is recent. You 
remember it and there is no point in a re-run. To make my 
position clear, ~et me say only that I opposed the incursion 
before it began; I was saddened by its beginning; I regard it, 
even now, with regret, although it is held in some quarters to 
have been a ''successful operation." 
At the time, it seemed to me that the incurs icn thr~st 
the war deep into what had been, for all practical purpc~es , 
the only non-dependent nation in Indochina in which the~e 
existed a measure of stability self-achieved under ~ rse.sonably 
responsive civilian government. Most serious, the Ce.ml;od ian 
incursion enlarged the battlefield. In so doi~g , it promised 
to prolong the U. S. involvement and open u p ~ new sc~:ce of 
U. S. casualties. 
That position was not arrived <'-t l ir.;'.~:!:; ly .. It ::.. s not 
re-asserted lightly now. The Cambodian ~r.cm·sion was jus tified 
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largely in terms of saving American lives. That is a considera-
tion that has always weighed heavily with me and every other 
member of the Senate. It was apparent then, however, and it 
is apparent now that the termination of our involvement in the 
war in Viet Nam and a prompt withdrawal would save far more 
~ 1'\...1.-{un..-11.. ~\. fOtv ??l.-~ [•<-'' .t..__., 
American livesAthan an enlargement of the a~ea of conflict. 
As it was, in tre brief in vas ion of Cambodia a year 
ago 362 Americans died and 2, 205 were wounded--in the p:.-:~•:: es " 
of 11 saving American lives." And in the process of 11 se.v ~. !1g 
American lives, 11 our forces in Indochina have incur~~ ;:r.l r ::.sual-
ties of 4,000 dead and 18,000 wounded in the year s in:~ the 
Cambodian incursion. In the light of those grim figi-.::'~c:-:: it 
may well be asked--are we saving lives or saving face ? 'rhe 
question becomes even more pertinent when rmt ::.:1 ·::r.c; ~ '"'.:~::; pective 
of total casualties: 54,000dead; almost 300, C00 WD'.tr:J:< , since 
the beginning of this tragic conflict. 
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This sacrifice of American life to date is indicativP. 
of the magnitude of the war's toll. The people, for whose 
benefit it was intended, have, themselves, suffered 
greatly in the war. Hundreds of thousands of Indochinese men, 
women and children, have been killed and maimed. The war has 
created millions of refugees. Ancient cultures and the natural 
environment in which they flourished have been damaged beyond 
calculation by the devastating tools of modern warfare. 
If the war was widened by the Cambodian incursion, 
it was widened, again, by the Laotian incursion. With that 
development, what was once the Vietnamese conflict became a 
full-fledged Indochina war. What was once an American involve-
ment in South~Viet Nam was consolidated into an American invol ve-
ment in all of Indochina. Notwithstanding linguistic gymnastics, 
an extension of warfare into vast new areas of combat cannot be 
depicted as a contraction of the war. 
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The fact is that we are still held fast in the ever-
shifting current of a struggle which has gone on almost cont i nu-
ously for a quarter of a century. It is a war without light a t 
the end of the tunnel. It is a war which does not stop at the 
borders of South Viet Nam. It does not stop at the borders of 
Cambodia. It does not stop at the borders of Laos. Where, t hen> 
is the end? Indeed, there may be none, unless it is in Peking 
or beyond, in a worldwide nuclear inferno. 
How we are entrapped or, more accurately perhaps, how 
we entrap ourselves in this pattern of expanding violenc e i s 
illustrated by events in Cambodia. I would note that on Apri l 
30, 1970, there were scarcely a half-dozen American offic ial s 
in Cambodia and they were carrying out the most limited diplo-
matic functions. There are now many times that number and t hey 
are carrying on a variety of functions. 
On April 30, 1970, we had no obligations whatsoever 
to the government of Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia; its fa t e wa s 
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in its own hands. Since the overthrow of Sihanouk, we have 
already made aid-commitments totaling $260 million to the 
successor government. That government's fate is not in its 
own hands; it is now in ours. It is dependent for survival on 
the United States and on the Saigon government which, in turn, 
is dependent on the United States. 
To be sure, the U. S. ground forces which were sent 
into the Cambodian border regions were withdrawn after a campaign 
of several weeks. To be sure, in Laos, U. S. service personnel 
have not set foot on the ground in any great numbers. Presumably, 
in deference to the Cooper-Church amendment, they have been 
restricted to hovering a few feet above the ground. However, 
U. S. planes and helicopters crisscross Laos and Cambodia many 
times a day. They fly missions of bombing and other direct 
combat support, supply, transport, evacuation, reconnaissance 
and whatever. U. S. plane~ and helicopters are now shot down 
in both Cambodia ~nd Laos as well as in Viet Naffi and meu often 
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die when they are shot down. We do not disinvolve ourselves 
withdrawing on the ground while we plunge in more deeply through 
the air. Involvement is involvement, whatever it is called. 
To be sure, the President deserves every credit for 
having reduced overall U. S. troops numbers in Viet Nam by more 
than 200,000 since the beginning of his Administration. But 
there are over 300,000 Americans still in Indochina . Further-
more, the use of U. S. air-power seems much more intensive than 
a year ago--that, in a primitive region which has already been 
bombed with more than twice the total mnnage dropped in both 
World War II and the Korean War. 
Costs are costs wherever incurred. Casualties a re 
casualties whether they are received on the ground or in the 
air. While · lower costs are better than higher and fewer 
casualties are obviously to be preferred to more, all losses 
are tragic in a mistaken war. 
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If it is not in the interest of this nation to be in 
the war with ground forces, how can it be with air forces? To 
be sure, it may seem more palatable but it is not more purposeful . 
It is not less wasteful. 
The prerequisite of a meaningful application of the 
Nixon Doctrine in Southeast Asia seems to me to be the termina-
tion of the U. S. military involvement--land, air and sea--in 
Indochina and military withdrawal from that region, lock, stock 
and barrel. That termination is not yet visible. That with-
drawal is not yet in sight. 
It is not only with regard to Indochina that there 
are grounds for concern over what has happened to the Nixon 
Doctrine since April 1970. Digressions or delays appear to be 
developing elsewhere in Asia. It is many months later, but the 
details of the Okinawan settlement have yet to be completed by 
the Executive Branch. Difficulties with Japan have also a risen 
over trade questions and a short time ago were even allowed to 
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reach a tempestuous stage . As I s ee it, U. S.-Japanese trade is 
of immense value to both countries even as a political relation-
ship of mutual consideration and forebearance between the two 
countries is essential to the elaboration of the Nixon .Doctrine 
in the Western Pacific . It is disturbing, therefore, to find 
what appearsto be the intrusion of petty bickering and personal 
pique into these vital ties . 
Also of great importance to the Nixon Doctrine is the 
restoration of civility with the Chinese People's Republic . The 
President has shown a consistent initiative in this connection. 
Whether a satisfactory relationship can be achieved at this 
time is another matter . Certainly, it is not a very promising 
prospect when the Indochinese war has again been extended to 
within minutes bombing range of the Chinese borcers and, in the 
circumstances, the Chinese have re- affirmed publicly their completf 
support of the North Vietnamese . Moreover, U. S . policy has yet 
to come to grips with the vehement rejection of a ''two-China '' 
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concept by both the government of the Republic of China and 
the Chinese People's Republic. Both insist that Taiwan and 
mainland China are parts of one Chinese nation. 
Elsewhere in the world, in Western Europe in particular, 
there seems also to have been a retrogression from the Nixon 
Doctrine. While the need for a cut in the consignment of U. S. 
forces to Europe is more and more recognized in the Senate, the 
reluctance of the Executive Branch to act remains as great under 
this Administration as it was under its predecessor. It is 
reluctance, apparently, stimulated by the anxieties of the 
German and other European governments who remain unwilling, 
nevertheless, to relieve this nation of any substantial part 
of the present one-sided burden of the costs of NATO defense. 
To maintain U. S. forcgs in Europe is estimated to 
account for $14 billion of the annual Defense Department budget. 
This expenditure is made, presumably, to forestall or to meet a 
possible military thrust from the Soviet Union. It is an 
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expenditure which has gone on year in and year out for almost 
two decades. In the meantime, by contrast, in the policies of 
both the Western European countries and the Soviet Union, the 
fear of such a conflict has been progressively downgraded and, 
today, the accent in both parts of Europe is almost entirely on 
the contacts of peace. 
Let me make clear that the sentiment in the Senate for 
a change in U. S. policies regarding NATO has nothing to do with 
severing treaty relationships with Western Europe or with the 
complete withdrawal of the U. S. military garrison from Europe . 
The NATO treaty remains highly regarded and a U. S. military 
presence in Europe, as an earnest of the importance which thw 
nation still attaches to the alliance, is a principle that has 
long been accepted. That is not the quec·sion. What is sought 
in the Senate, rather, is a substantial reduct~on i~ the half-
million of U. S. forces with dependent8 that are maintained in 
Europe ~t such great cost to the peo ple of this nation. The 
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resistance of the Executive Branch to this change in my judgment 
is ill-founded and may well produce, in time, a Congressional 
reaction which will compel drastic reductions. 
To bring these remarks to a close, I want to note again. 
as I did at the outset, my deep belief in the urgency of the 
adjustments of U. S. policy which are implicit 1n the Nixon 
Doctrine. I would be less than candid, however, if I did not 
express the concern which I have with the dive~gencies, digres-
sions, dodges and delays which have bee11 enco~ntere~ in carrying 
out the Doctrine. 
We have not escaped the consequences of this p~ocras-
tination at home. In my judgment the absence of a vigorous 
follow-through on the Doctrine has had much to do with the 
persistence of the inflation and the slack in the economy. It 
has had much to do with our contir:ui~g inability to confront 
fully the financial and other problems of the States and 
localities . It has had much to do wi ~.h tl1e i:1c..de::quate v.ay 
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in which we are meeting the whole range of c ompelling needs of 
our national life whether they be pollution, welfa~e, u~employ-
ment, violence or whatever . 
There is blame enough to spare for things done and ~ot 
done. Where the finger points often depends on who is pointing 
and I shall not point mine. The fundamental difficulty, as I 
see it, is that the President and the Congress function in a 
government grown immense. It is a government whose gears raust 
grind in a complex synchronization if they are to grind at all. 
The machinery is not easily moved by the President alone and 
certainly not, alone, by the Congress. Yet it must be moved i~ 
there is to be a fulfillment of the promise of the Nixon Doctrine 
and a realistic adjustment of our policies in line l>i ith its 
implications. In my judgment, the primary need, the critical 
need,is an end to the involvement in Indochina: an enc, period. 
In their separate Constitutional auth~rity as necezs~ry 3~~ j~ 
cooperation, where possible, the effort must be made by ~he 
President and the Congress to meet that need. 
The Republic d2serves nc le2s, 
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